Presbyterian Discipline

July 2002

Stuart R. Jones

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. KINGDOM DISCIPLINE

II. CHURCH POWER

III. JURISDICTION

IV. ADDRESSING OFFENSES

V. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS

VI. THE TRIAL

VII. CENSURES

VIII. CORRECTION OF JUDICATORY ACTS

IX. COMPLAINTS AND JUDICATORY CORRECTION

X. CONSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE

PRESBYTERIAN DISCIPLINE

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE AND PERSPECTIVE

Racks and thumbscrews aside, a major injustice of the Inquisition was an unnatural union of pastor and prosecutor in one person:

As a judge, he was vindicating the faith and avenging God for the wrongs inflicted on him by misbelief. He was more than a judge, however, he was a father-confessor striving for the salvation of the wretched souls perversely bent on perdition. In both capacities he acted with an authority far higher than an earthly judge. If his sacred mission was accomplished, it mattered little what methods were used.[1]

Presbyterian discipline contends with an analogous dilemma. Pastoral counseling or informal action is the type of Church discipline every normal church officer prefers. It bears a remedial purpose and readiness to forgive. But what happens when the member refuses to change or denies committing sin? Either the church officer has been mistaken or the church member has a much greater problem requiring attention. A wall goes up between the confronter and confronted. The vulnerability necessary to receive grace hardens into defense. The pastoral bond of trust begins to unravel and an adversarial relationship may develop. Discovery of the truth becomes the order of the day. Absent miraculous revelation this is not always easy.

Much published material exists on the informal ministry of correction in the Church– particularly counseling. This is a salutary emphasis. Something needs to be said about what needs to be done when informal counsel is rejected, however. Though much of the present work is devoted to formal procedures, it should not be understood to suggest that formal trials are the essence of Church discipline. Church trials happen when everything else has failed. Why bother then? Because a church without the means of correcting its membership risks its identity as a faithful congregation called out of the world. For this reason, Presbyterians have long recognized discipline as a third mark of the Church.[2] Though formal discipline is a stressful and unhappy affair, its importance cannot be ignored. Is fair and credible formal church discipline possible without becoming inquisitorial? Perhaps not in the mind of modern man.[3] Yet it must be possible if the Church is to perform the totality of her mission.

Formal discipline, to be fair, must adopt a different posture than that assumed during informal discipline. Process itself becomes more important because a dispute has replaced conversation. The burden of a disciplinary situation may seem to be enough for the Presbyterian officer without adding procedural hoops to jump through. Yet the need for fair and credible discipline calls for some decent and orderly procedure. Due process is not a purely American idea or civil concern. In 1537 at Smalcald, a treatise was adopted by Lutheran reformers that included the following:

…it is evident that the officials (as they are called) have exercised intolerable arbitrariness and, either on account of avarice or on account of other evil desires, have tormented men and excommunicated them without the due process of law.[4]

The necessity of due process does not justify every tradition or procedure. Yet this necessity cannot be met without for some fair method of proceeding. Answers, to the extent they are suggested here, are offered with trepidation. More than answers, what is offered is historical context to foster a better appreciation and understanding of the principles of Presbyterian discipline. These principles are occasionally mentioned in Presbyterian digests or commentaries on the Church Order. Yet such manuals often are focused on interpreting a given law or case by precedents. It is easy to loose sight of the big picture and how present practice came about.

Historical perspective helps illuminate whether the Church is blindly following tradition or the tradition has merit. It helps identify core concerns often lost sight of later. Those early concerns may hold the key to interpreting what is now an arcane procedure or term. When problems arise, as they inevitably do, with implementing some Presbyterian canon law, the reflexive instinct of some is to blame the church constitution and to proceed by nullification. If asked to frame a better provision, the critics rarely have one to offer. Sometimes the solution would be found in better historical awareness and perspective. For this reason, the topics discussed here, though adapted from the topics found in Presbyterian books of discipline, are treated in a larger historical perspective.

The sufficiency of Scripture to order discipline and other church business does not justify simple proof-texting. One of the perspectives offered here, is that Scripture presents the church in a kingdom context. This general context is the reason for not only church discipline, but the need for orderly government procedure in the Church. Proof texts like Matthew 18 or 1 Corinthians 5 help the initiate see a biblical warrant for church discipline. Only when such texts are related to the larger context of Scripture, does a proper kingdom perspective on discipline emerge. An isolated text is analogous to a single mountain slope. We need to stand on the summit to see the whole terrain. The Kingdom teaching of Jesus is such a summit. It provides the proper perspective on Matthew 18. Church discipline is in this text, but as a part of the larger vista of the Kingdom. There are good books available on the Kingdom teaching of Jesus, so this perspective will not be closely examined here. It is mentioned because this perspective must be kept in mind when evaluating and reflecting on discipline policies in the Church.

A final note on the importance of prayer is necessary. Any one who has faced a disciplinary situation that threatens his church or ministry probably needs little stimulus to pray. The church officer faced with personal weakness and confusion soon realizes he needs all the help, divine and human, that he can get. This work is intended to supply some human help. It is no substitute for God’s help. Prayer, not only for oneself, but even enemies, is part of new covenant life and discipline. Because the “already” present aspect of Christ’s kingdom addresses the hearts of stubborn rebels, prayer is not a super-added or foreign feature to the process of discipline. It calls forth the resources of the King to work with or above our procedural efforts.

SIGNIFICANT DATES FOR PRESBYTERIAN DISCIPLINE

1559 The First National Synod of the French Reformed Churches in Paris adopts the French Confession and adopts the initial acts which begin formation of the “French Discipline.” These acts address general governance as well as disciplinary matters.

1560 Knox’s Book of Discipline and the Scot’s Confession are issued. The Belgic Confession is also issued in 1561. Like the Melville and Travers productions, the Book of Discipline is a general plan of government of which “disciplinary” process is a part.

1568 The Convent of Wesel meets, followed by the Synod of Emden (1571). These lay a foundation for Dutch polity (the later Dort Order).

1578 Melville’s Book of Discipline (the Book of Policy) is issued.

1587 Travers’ shorter Book of Discipline is developed after his lengthier Explicatio of 1574. It is published in 1644 for the Westminster Assembly.

1643-47 The Westminster Assembly works on various forms relevant to discipline.

1690 Scottish Presbyterianism is officially re-established.

1697 The Scottish “Barrier Act” goes in effect limiting the power of the General Assembly to make rules binding on presbyteries without the majority of presbyteries approving.

1707 The Form of Process is adopted in the Church of Scotland which addresses judicial procedure.

1709 Pardovan’s “Collections,” the first edition, is issued.

1729 The Adopting Act helps shape constitutionalism in the American church.

1788 The Constitution of the PCUSA goes into effect, including the Forms of Process. The first General Assembly meets in 1789.

1821 The first major revision of the PCUSA disciplinary standards goes into effect.

1837 The Abrogation of the 1801 Plan of Union raises questions about the constitutional powers of a General Assembly to excind judicatories without the color of discipline.

1856-1860 Debates in print take place on a revised Book of Discipline involving Hodge, Thornwell, and Dabney

1861 Southern Presbyterians are constituted separate from the Northern Church.

1879 The Southern Church adopts a new Book of Church Order.

1884 The Northern Church adopts a new Book of Discipline.

1934 The Northern Church adopts a revised Book of Discipline which remains substantially in effect through the 1960’s.

1938 The Orthodox Presbyterian Church (Presbyterian Church of America) which was founded in 1936, adopts a provisional Book of Discipline in 1938. It is finally adopted in revised form in 1940. The 1940 BD is based somewhat on the 1934 BD, but is greatly simplified. Revisions follow from 1983 onward.

1973 The Presbyterian Church in America is established and adopts a church order based on the 1933 edition of the Southern Church order. General revisions to the Southern Church order had been enacted in 1925 and 1945.

CHAPTER ONE: KINGDOM DISCIPLINE

LEGALESE AND FORMS

One complaint about the legal profession is its arcane terminology. Suspicion has been raised that difficult terms of art intentionally prevent the layman from obtaining justice without hiring an expert. In like manner, the language of Presbyterian government and discipline has disturbed some because of its legal tone. A man off the street, having occasion to drift into a presbytery meeting, may be surprised to hear such terms as “charges, jurisdiction, judicatories, courts of the church, and judicial process.” Even the benign sounding “consistory” of the Reformed polity is derived from the world of the ecclesiastical court.[5] Such language may seem better suited to the theocracy under Moses or a secular courtroom. New Testament discipline should be of a family affair. The very word “discipline” has a different connotation than “judgment.” The Lord directly chastises his children (Heb 12:5); the officers of the church are called to pastor the flock while the King is in heaven. Legal terminology in many minds seems foreign to the spirit of the New Testament. The old French Discipline had this provision:

All possible care shall be taken; that those formalities and terms which are used in Courts of Law, may be avoided in the exercise of Church-Discipline.[6]

This provision apparently was more than idle advice. The Synod of Montauban (1594), in dealing with an appeal, decided

That because the said Church hath not produced the Grant of that Synod, Monsieur Esnard shall remain where he is at present in the Province of Poictou; and moreover the said Church shall be censured for having used Terms of Law in the said Appeal.[7]

Though the language of civil law has been used by Presbyterians, arguments from civil law disturbed Charles Hodge when he found them employed to obscure the customary and received Presbyterian understanding of appeals and complaints. He stated:

There is a good deal of confusion and error often occasioned by the mere designation of our ecclesiastical bodies as courts or judicatories. They are so called when not sitting in judicial capacity. We find lawyers much troubled to know what we mean by courts…. If our system and nomenclature trouble the lawyers, it is no less true that the lawyers trouble us. They often bring with them into ecclesiastical bodies modes of thinking and reasoning borrowed from their previous pursuits, which are entirely inappropriate to our system.[8]

The notion of a “church court” is much older than the Presbyterian establishment which employs the term so freely. Anglo-Saxon history demonstrates the point:

In England, besides those branches of jurisdiction that belong to the institution and deprivation of the ministers of the church, the law has submitted various other matters to the jurisdiction of the bishops. In ancient times, all matters, as well spiritual and temporal, were determined in the county court, where the bishop and earl sat together. But William the Conqueror separated the ecclesiastical from the temporal courts; and, since his days, all the causes called ecclesiastical or spiritual, have been tried, not in the civil courts of the realm, but in courts held by authority of the bishops, and according to the forms of proceeding peculiar to those courts.[9]

This observation by Hill shows the utility of the term “church” court when used in an environment where confusion of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction is present. It also calls to mind an era when courts were held to exercise governmental functions other than judicial. Whether the term remains helpful today may be debated, but as a concept, it is not a Presbyterian invention or monopoly.

The code by which Presbyterian discipline is regulated has occasionally had the ring of civil law to it. The Church of Scotland adopted a procedural code in 1707 called the Form of Process. This title was probably taken over from James Dalrymple of Stair’s work regarding the laws of Scotland. Regarding the first edition of that work (1681) it is stated that

Some copies have, bound in, with a separate title-page, Modus Litigandi, or Form of Process Observed Before the Lords of Council and Session in Scotland (pages 1 to 44).[10]

The establishment of Presbyterianism in 1690 in Scotland following years of persecution, no doubt necessitated greater attention to procedures involved in the Church’s discipline. Pardovan’s Collections sought to remedy the defect of forgotten detail in the administration of Presbyterian order (cf. Preface). The Church apparently anticipated this need in the sphere of discipline when it adopted the Form of Process. As a state church establishment, it is not surprising that terms of civil law might appear in the disciplinary code. Also, the need for a fair and established form of due process in church affairs must have been keenly felt, following the tyranny of monarchical inspired prelacy. This is noted to emphasize the historical environment in which the codes for early Presbyterian discipline were enacted. When the Westminster Assembly proposed a disciplinary code decades earlier under the rubric of “A Directory for Church Government, for Church Censures, and Ordination of Ministers” a slight difference in historical context existed.[11] Though reaction to tyrannical prelacy was a similar factor, the English Parliament’s wariness of church self-government in the realm of discipline may explain the less judicial tone of the proposed “directory.”

In 1788, the disciplinary portion of the constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America was called the Forms of Process. The tie to the Scottish Church’s discipline is obvious, despite the peculiar use of the plural, “Forms,” to describe a much shorter plan of discipline.[12] In response to a query from “the Committee of the Dutch Church,” the Synod of New York and Philadelphia stated in 1786 that

The Rules of our discipline, & the form of process in our Church Judicatures, are contained in Pardovan’s (alias Stewarts) collections, in conjunction with the Acts of our own Synod, the power of which, in matters purely ecclesiastical, we consider as equal to the power of any Synod or general Assembly in the world.[13]

When it came time to consider a draught of the proposed constitution, a motion carried in 1787 that “the form of process in Stewart of Pardovan’s collection be read & considered as a basis of deliberation along with the draught.”[14]

The Form of Process of the Scottish Church, though not found as a unit in Pardovan’s first edition (1709), is found as an appendix in subsequent editions. It is this document that was in view when the American church adopted its Forms of Process in 1788. The connection to the Scottish Church discipline and a perusal of the much briefer American guide is sufficient proof that the American Presbyterian discipline had little or no aspiration to imitate civil procedure. The claim is sometimes made that American Presbyterian discipline is a hybrid of Anglo-Saxon law and the Bible. If so, this hybrid had to develop after 1820—the year before extensive revision. The 1788 plan was a brief derivation from the Scottish Form of 1707, which in turn took its name—if little of its content—from Stair’s Institutes. The latter concerned Scottish rather than English law. The label “Forms of Process” would eventually yield to Book of Discipline or Rules of Discipline to describe the various plans of discipline in American Presbyterianism.

KINGDOM LAW AND JUDGMENT

Apart from historical context, Presbyterian terms and forms of discipline provoke an examination of what sort of society the Church is. Though the church is an extended family, it is also the center of God's special Kingdom on earth. The gospels are full of Kingdom proclamation. This Kingdom, though very different from other dominions, is still a kingdom. A kingdom has its own laws and officials who supervise or govern according to those laws. New Testament law differs from earthly laws by being more internally focused and God-centered. The word "law" probably is used more sparingly in the New Testament because of Judaistic connotations and the reality of an indwelling Holy Spirit who writes he laws of God on the hearts of believers. The more sparing use of the term in the New Testament does not mean the idea is absent. Paul certainly has some standard in mind when he delivers the sinner of 1 Corinthians 5 over to Satan. In addition, the Westminster Larger Catechism makes an explicit connection between Christ’s Kingly office, law, and discipline:

Christ executeth the office of a king, in calling out of the world a people to himself, and giving them officers, laws, and censures, by which he visibly governs them…[Ans. 45]

This answer reflects an argument prepared by George Gillespie. Gillespie fought against Erastian and other misguided views of the church during his time as a Scottish commissioner to the Westminster Assembly. Prior to considering the catechisms, Gillespie made or drafted the following remarks thought to be “occasioned by Selden’s statements on 20^th February 1644, in regard to the discussions on Matthew, chap. xviiii,…”[15] Note:

The visible political ministerial church is the kingdom of Christ, and he is the Head, King, Judge, and Lawgiver thereof, Isa. ix. 6; Isa xxii. 21,22: Psal. ii.6; Luke i.33; I Cor. xv.24; Eph. i. 21-23 ….Now, in the administration or government of a kingdom these three things are necessarily required,— 1. Laws. 2. Officers, ministers, judges, courts. 3. Censures and punishments of offences. Which three being universally necessary in every kingdom can least of all be supposed to be wanting in he church and kingdom of Jesus Christ, who hath been more faithful in the execution of his kingly office, and hath provided better for the government of his church, than ever any kingdom or state in this world did for a civil government. I add, the laws, judicatories, and censures in the kingdom of Christ must be spiritual and ecclesiastical, because his kingdom is not of this world, and his servants cannot take the sword. John xviii.36….[16]

The form of this argument looks like a repackaging of one offered by an opponent of the Presbyterian way in the previous century:

Furthermore, judgment ecclesiastical we say is necessary for decision of controversies rising between man and man, and for correction of faults committed in the affairs of God; unto the due execution whereof there are three things necessary, laws, judges, and a supreme governor of judgments.[17]

Whatever shaped Gillespie’s argument, he used the Kingdom idea in a powerful way. He also made a careful qualification regarding the spiritual or heavenly nature of this kingdom. The difference is important to the question of how we view discipline. The “already-not yet” paradigm for Christ’s kingdom was not used in those days. It was common to attribute the differences between the church and state to the distinction between redemption and creation. Christ is the mediatorial head of the Church and God, as the sovereign Creator, ordains civil government. The former defines church power and remedies; the latter shapes civil power and remedies.

The latter view is helpful but can obscure the underlying unity between redemption and a renewed creation. Kingdom consummation entails ultimate coercion and violence against the wicked. Church censures are not different from civil punishments simply because the Kingdom of Christ is “not of this world.” The difference has much to do with the “not yet” phase of church kingdom power. The estate of Christ’s humiliation still colors the life of the church and calls forth kingdom power that is “spiritual.”

Greater emphasis on grace in the New Covenant may seem to refute any legal framework in the New Testament era. The law and all its detail, seen from one perspective, was a mark of Israel’s servitude. The New Covenant and indwelling Spirit emphasizes our sonship status. Yet, the New Covenant also intensifies and shapes New Testament discipline. Covetousness can result in withdrawal of fellowship (1 Cor 5:11). When Ananias and Sapphira lie to the Holy Spirit, thinking perhaps that they are simply lying to men, they receive a startling "sentence." Whether their deaths are regarded as discipline or judgment, the theme of judgment is not absent from the New Testament.

Once the reality of New Testament judgment is recognized, one must deal with legal process. We are not yet at that historical endpoint where the penetrating knowledge of God perfectly judges offenders. Yet the Church is called to render a type of judgment and this activity affects the final judgment. Lacking God’s omniscience, the Church requires a careful means for proceeding to judgment. Invocation of lawful oaths, witnesses, and orderly process are part of the not yet method of current judgment. Church courts presently share some of the weaknesses and methods of human civil courts but are distinguished by a “binding and loosing” power more intimately connected to the judgment of Heaven (Mt. 16:19 and 18:18).

The “binding and loosing” texts of the New Testament have been a great focus of attention and debate. While debate has turned on who is given this authority and what relationship it has to the “binding and losing” of heaven, there has also been debate about what the terms mean. Some regard Matthew 16 as transferring to Peter a special rabbinic power to formulate correct doctrine. That only a doctrinal, and not a disciplinary power is in view, was argued by one commissioner to the Westminster Assembly, the Semitic scholar, John Lightfoot. He says with regard to Mt 16:19:

Here I urged, That we might take up the words “verbatim;” for that I saw some take the “kingdom of heaven” for heaven itself, others for the church; which I thought could hardly be made good: but that the common and proper signification of the phrase in the Scripture is the ‘preaching of the word to the Gentiles;’ and for that I saw that “binding and loosing” was commonly taken among us for discipline, which I proved to mean only doctrinally, by divers evidences both from Scripture and the style of the Jews; but this I could not reduce us to.[18]

Assuming that the terms frequently translated “bind and loose” are correctly translated “forbid and allow,” it does not follow that the authority being delegated is only doctrinal.[19] The context of Mathew 18, where these words are repeated, is disciplinary. Furthermore, the “Great Confession” of Matthew 16 which occasions this delegation of authority, is a confession of Christ’s Messianic status. In the thinking of Peter’s time, Messianic office was profoundly focused on kingly office.[20] According to Psalm 2, the Lord’s anointed one is a judge of nations. Authority to judge is the common denominator of kingly office, delegated power to Peter, proclaiming truth, and settling matters of offense. When Jesus delegates the power to “forbid and allow” it is natural to regard this as judicial—not just the “dogmatic” power of a rabbi. Use of the term in Mt 18:15ff confirms the judicial nature of the power Jesus is delegating. A censure is in view. “Forbidding and allowing” constitute a “sentence” on a concrete case and individual.

CHURCH FAMILY COURT

The Westminster Confession presents the church as both a kingdom and a family.[21] As a kingdom, a power of judgment exists. Though this power ultimately belongs to God, this very function is given to the Church in Matt 16 and Matt 18 where the words "binding and loosing" are used.

Despite this power, the church is a family. A healthy family does not live like a law court, collecting depositions and sworn testimony from its members, etc. The family is meant to nurture members in an atmosphere of love and trust where openness and informality rule. Since the church is a spiritual family, legal formalities may seem anomalous. Counseling, mediation, and arbitration need more consideration when disputes arise in the Church.[22] Though these methods of reconciliation are outside the scope of this work, their potential usefulness should not be ignored. The 1821 Book of Discipline specified that it was when “all other means of removing offense have failed” that a church judicatory should hear a discipline case (IV.1).

The question is how to combine the kingdom and familial aspects of the Church. The Presbyterian solution is covenant. The disciplinary ministry of the Church may be illustrated by a horseshoe or bell curve. As a person trusts in Christ and presents himself for baptism, the elders guide the Church in making a fallible but judicial like determination that this person should be treated as a child of God.[23] From this point on, the church member is regarded as a family member and hopefully grows in grace (ascendant part of the curve), confirming the judgment of the Church. There may be bumps along the way where the curve becomes a bit jagged or less smooth. Informal admonitions become necessary. All this time discipline is primarily familial. When major incidents arise and wrongdoing is denied (thus in dispute), the judicial aspect of the Kingdom comes into greater prominence. A matter may become serious enough to require witnesses and testimony.

If a member is not living like a child of God, a new judicial determination is required. This is illustrated below by the descending portion of the curve. What some have called “informal” discipline” corresponds to what is here described as familial training and correction.[24] Formal discipline takes on a legal aspect because of a crisis where the consequences are important. Theologically and ecclesiastically, the covenant is still in view. Baptism marks one's personal familial identity within God's covenant. Excommunication is the Church’s mark on a covenant breaker.[25] A judicial type of scrutiny is called for in making such a serious covenantal determination.

IN COVENANT RELATION

*BAPTISM *REMOVAL

The judgment on Christ and the judgment of the Last Day are foundational judgments for the church and the world. They are not the only judgments of God (cf. 1 Corinthians 5:3,12,13). The responses of individuals to the gospel or to discipline are to be assessed in the final judgment.

CHAPTER TWO: CHURCH POWER

The correcting and censuring ministry of the Church involves an exercise of power. It is a power that has been questioned or abused throughout history and so requires consideration in the larger context of general church power. May the Church impose a tax on its members? May it require restitution when the collection plate is robbed? May it outlaw work at a hospital where abortions are performed? Identification of fundamental principles is necessary in order to understand the lawful and proper spheres in which the Church may assert power.

When the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America adopted its constitution in 1788, among the basic principles it affirmed was

All church power, whether exercised by the body in general, or in the way of representation by delegated authority, is only ministerial and declarative.[26]

GENERAL AND SPECIFIC POWERS

The words “ministerial and declarative”[27] are chosen as a contrast to the magisterial power assumed by the Roman Church which legislates new rules and doctrines binding on the conscience. Ministerial authority lacks wide discretion in the realm of legislating matters or rules for faith in practice. It must content itself with administrating and declaring God’s revealed will in Scripture.

The church that emerged from the shadow of Rome, did not simply define church power negatively. It was also necessary to set forth the legitimate powers that belonged to the church.

Calvin specifies the “spiritual” powers of the church in terms of doctrine, jurisdiction, and making laws.[28] In the Reformed tradition, it became common to distinguish three types or categories of church power: 1) potestas dogmatikh, 2) potestas diataktikh, and 3) potestas diakritikh.[29] These powers were understood to be derivative from Christ’s power and subordinate to it. George Hill added that they are limited by the liberties of Christ’s disciples.[30] The extent of diatactic power is, in measure, related to how strictly the regulative principle of worship and government is viewed. Diatactic power corresponds to the wider meaning of the term “discipline” as it has sometimes been applied to what is called a “Church Order” or “Form of Government” (e.g. Knox’s, Melville’s, and Travers’ “Books of Discipline”; cf. also the French Discipline).

MINISTERIAL AND DECLARATIVE POWERS OF THE CHURCH

DOGMATIC	DIATACTIC	DIACRITIC
Doctrine	Order	Discipline
Preaching, Confessions, Sacraments (Turretin), etc.	Constitutions, Laws, Ordinances (Bannerman) etc.	Censures, Restorations, etc.

The functions subsumed under each power are not precisely the same for various theologians. Administration of sacraments is a dogmatic power according to Turretin. It could be argued that sacramental administration is just as closely related to jurisdiction and discipline. James Bannerman structures a large segment of his work around the idea of church power and places sacramental administration (ordinances) under the diatactic category:

There is the “potestas diataktikh,” the power belonging to the Church in the way of administering ordinances and government in the Christian society. This power comprehends the right to carry into effect the institutions and laws which Christ has appointed within the Church: it does not involve the power to bind the conscience or obedience of its members to the observance of new or additional ordinances, enacted by itself. In regard to ordinances, the authority of the Church in the dispensation of them is purely administrative;…In regard to laws, the authority of the Church is no more than declaratory, …[31]

Something akin to the division of church powers indicated above was used in the polity debate between Independents and Presbyterians at the Westminster Assembly. This is illustrated by application of these enumerated powers to the interpretation of Acts 15:[32]

Mr. Rutherford said, 1. The opponents themselves hold doctrinal power in a congregation is church power, which agrees not to single teachers. 2. The doctrinal power and the power of jurisdiction in an assembly are the same power. 3. That a rebuke given out from a synod is juridical, and differs only gradu from excommunication.

Mr. Vines said, There is here both the dogmatic and the diatactic power, and kri,sij upon both; that he doubts of evpiti,qesqai, it cannot be found for imponi in all the New Testament.[33]

I [Gillespie] said, there were three great evils here: heresy, which was remedied by the dogmatic power; scandal, remedied by the diatactic power; and schism, or sta,sij made by those that troubled the disciples, remedied by the synodical admonition.

Independents could concede a dogmatic power beyond the local church.[34] They participated in a quasi-Synod that formed the Westminster Confession and a few years later established their own confession closely based on it. This was not a local church action. As such, there is a species of appeal beyond the local congregation that might be allowed:

…one Mr. F, a stranger in this Town came to confute you in point of Story. He left us to judge whether Presbytery was not an unjust Domination; but for your saying they admitted not of appeal, he utterly denied it before the people, and told us many stories of their synods by way of counsel.[35]

The issues that most divided the Assembly concerned the distribution of power to ordain officers and discipline members. In some ways, the power to discipline was the greatest bone of contention because it engaged separate opposition from the Erastian party. This group generally denied disciplinary power—at least respecting excommunication—to the Church. Some Erastians might allow it if the state held ultimate supervision and appellate jurisdiction. Independents saw this power as belonging to the church, but recognized no distribution of the power beyond the local assembly. As long as higher church assemblies had only “advisory” power, Independents and Erastians did not mind. To concede diatactic and diacritic powers to higher or broader assemblies was to concede the Presbyterian polity. Once a synod is allowed, distribution of power defines the polity. The disciplinary power focused the polity debate.

This debate over distribution of power could be called, in an American sense, “pre-constitutional.” A general theory of Presbyterianism existed which was regarded as a matter jure divino or of divine prescription. At the Westminster Assembly this was interpreted by some Presbyterians to mean that many or all of the powers of the local church also reside with the higher assemblies, including the power of discipline. The Form of Presbyterial Church Government, developed by the Assembly (under the heading “Of the power in common of all these Assemblies”) stated that it was “lawful, and agreeable to the word of God” for the various assemblies to summon people within their bounds, to “dispense church censures,” and that these assemblies “have power to hear and determine such causes and differences as do orderly come before them.”[36] The Independent, Thomas Goodwin argued that

Either there is the same power in all these assemblies, or different: If the same, then what good doth it? The Sanhedrim [sic], when one did not obey, he was put to death.[37]

Gillespie’s answer—appended in his notes—is “they have the same power, and more also extensively and in degrees.” The “lawful and agreeable” formula of the Assembly product appears to be a compromise position, developed in the debates of early October, 1644.[38]

Early Presbyterianism vested great power in the higher assemblies. Even at this time, however, a counter distributionary tendency arguably existed. Attempt to establish a “Form” or “Directory” for government, ordination, censures, etc. (like the earlier Scottish First and Second Books of Discipline) entail recognition of a constitution. This is a check on pure synodicalism.

The seed of constitutionalism exists in recognition of church power to devise or adopt canons of government and discipline. Initially, “acts” of higher synods were constituent elements of a continually growing constitution. Eventually, the acts of higher synods became subordinated, particularly in America, to a fixed written constitution. Both the written constitution and the earlier acts are derivatives of a general theory concerning church power and jus divinum Presbyterianism.

CONSTITUTIONALLY DISTRIBUTED POWERS

Charles Hodge argued against perceived independent tendencies in the Presbyterian Church by citing the strong place of the General Assembly in the Church of Scotland and that the constitution of the American Presbyterians was derived from this mother church. Hodge states “…our church, from the first, adopted the standards of the church of Scotland, both as to faith and the form of government….” and that

the General Assembly in Scotland had from the beginning acted as the governing body of the whole Church, exercising, whenever it saw fit, original jurisdiction; acting directly on the presbyteries, and individual ministers, citing, trying, condemning or acquitting them, as it deemed right; transferring pastors from one parish to another without the intervention of any of the lower courts; and, in short, exercising a general and immediate jurisdiction over the whole church.[39]

Hodge cites George Hill as his main authority in asserting the powers of the General Assembly. Yet this argument from authority cannot decide the wisdom or ultimate applicability of the Scottish polity for the American church. After 1788, the American Church imposed constitutional limits on its higher judicatories. Hodge himself recognizes the importance of constitutional regulation of church power. Yet in a debate over commissions, he disputes the notion that, “The General Assembly is vested only with defined powers, which it cannot enlarge without the original constituencies—the Presbyteries.” He states:

All legitimate Church courts act from inherent primary powers. Neither session, presbytery, synod, nor Assembly derives its powers from the constitution. The constitution is of the nature of a treaty, or compact between different portions of the Church, as to the way in which their inherent powers may be exercised….It is not the true theory of our government, therefore, that the General Assembly has only delegated powers….Much depends on the question, whether our constitution is a grant, or a limitation of powers.[40]

Too much weight should not be given to that portion of Hodge’s argument based on continuity of the American Presbyterian constitution with that of Scotland’s church. First, the established status of the Church of Scotland puts a different color on the meaning of “constitution” in